Most`theories of consciousness' are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ± the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information-processing models that can account for`Type-C' processes. Type-C processes can be speci®ed experimentally by identifying paradigms in which awareness of the stimulus is necessary for an intentional action. The Shallice (1988b) framework is put forward as providing an initial account of Type-C processes, which can relate perceptual consciousness to consciously performed actions. Further, we suggest that this framework may be re®ned through the investigation of the functions of prefrontal cortex. The formulation of our approach requires us to consider fundamental conceptual and methodological issues associated with consciousness. The most signi®cant of these issues concerns the scienti®c use of introspective evidence. We outline and justify a conservative methodological approach to the use of introspective evidence, with attention to the dif®culties historically associated with its use in psychology. q
Problems with the science of consciousness
Thirty years ago the attempt to produce scienti®c accounts of consciousness was a 
